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Abstract. The following paper outlines the doctoral research proposal
that was presented at the 2019JURIX Doctoral Consortium. The un-
dertaken dissertation aims to be a treatise exploring the intersection of
autonomy and freedom of individuals with increasingly capable and au-
tonomous (multi-agent) systems. The project is meant to encompass an
interdisciplinary analysis of the concept of autonomy and areas of influ-
ence which agents of the IoE can be expected to exercise. Ultimately, a
framework to explain exercise autonomy of individuals within a system
constrained by agents of the IoE will be established.
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1 Introduction
The undertaken dissertation aims to be a treatise exploring the intersection of
autonomy and freedom of individuals with increasingly capable and autonomous
(multi-agent) systems. The project is meant to encompass an interdisciplinary
analysis of the concept of autonomy and areas of influence which agents of the
IoE can be expected to exercise. Ultimately, a framework to explain exercise
autonomy of individuals within a system constrained by agents of the IoE will
be established. Coming from both the increasing use of such technology and
the increasing capability of the technology so deployed, thorough analysis of the
impact of agents on human autonomy and freedom is vital. This is exacerbated
by the high value society tends to attest to these principles. As this currently
remains an emerging issue, legal and policy research on this topic remains at
the frontier of understanding the defining challenges of society in the coming
decades.
2 Problem Description and State of the Art
2.1 General Remarks
This work proposes an inquiry into the concepts of freedom and autonomy as
they are aided and undermined by characteristics of and agents within the Inter-
net of Everything. The word autonomy is derived from the ancient greek terms
? Copyright c©2020 for this paper by its author. Use permitted under Creative Com-
mons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
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”auto” (meaning “self”) and ”nomos (meaning rule or law). This term is used
colloquially and therefore comes with considerable opaqueness; it can arguably
be used to denote the characteristic of free will, the capacity or action of self-
control or control over one’s life, the state of freedom of coercion, or a right to
or a value based on the above; all of which are dogmatically different.1
2.2 Law from Ethics from Morals from Ends - Tracing the concept
of Autonomy
For the purpose of this inquiry, namely the analysis of autonomy as a target of
influence and prediction, recourse will be had to three sources of meaning: (1) the
general scholastic consensus and relevant theories in the field of philosophy and
epistemology with respect to autonomy [25, 6]2, (2) moral and ethical frameworks
to autonomy [25]3, and (3) legal frameworks, specifically human rights regimes,
pertaining to autonomy.
The reasoning for this is best explained when working backwards from the
concrete and factual to the abstract. Legal frameworks, in short laws, structure
the relations between people and other entities and objects, (e.g. other people,
animals, material and immaterial objects, rights, etc.) of the system (i.e. society,
the world) the people are acting in. By imposing enforceable rules and non-
enforceable but authoritative endorsements, the legislative process steers indi-
vidual system-members’ behavior. Compliance is enforced through governmental
sanctions or incentives. These legal boundaries are set out to satisfy certain so-
cietal functions that are deemed important based on or at least influenced by a
set of values adopted by some part of the society by the legislative entity [24]4.
Not accounting for the ephemeral concept of natural law, the legal domain ends
here [11, 16].5 In other words, law is an inherently neutral set of tool, that is
1 The term autonomy can also be charged with (unambiguous) meaning in other spe-
cialized domains, such as computer science, robotics, etc. This section deals with
autonomy as pertaining to human agents in a broad setting.
2 The terms “ethics” and “morals” are not interchangeable. Ethics are value systems
of a certain group. Morality is then a subset of such ethics, namely a value sys-
tem dealing first and foremost with the notions of “right” and “wrong”. However,
this statement is undermined by the fact that the term ethics is commonly (and
colloquially) used interchangeably with morality.
3 The terms “ethics” and “morals” are not interchangeable. Ethics are value systems
of a certain group. Morality is then a subset of such ethics, namely a value system
dealing first and foremost with the notions of “right” and “wrong”.
4 Indeed, the social functions of law might be so closely interwoven with the underlying
moral or political imperatives that they are of “no use to anyone who does not
completely and exclusively endorse them”, according to Raz.
5 A legal exclusive positivist position is assumed here. More precisely, it is assumed
that morality does not affect validity of legal frameworks while it is acknowledged
that morality factually influences both the creation and implementation of legal
frameworks. In contrast, an inclusive positivist position would allow for invalidation
of a legal framework based on moral considerations while a natural law position
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structured along the lines of an underlying value system, to understand its pur-
pose and enactment an analytical, teleological approach with knowledge of this
underlying system is helpful.
Normative, i.e. rule-giving, frameworks which have not been legitimized by
a legislative process are (pseudo-) ethical frameworks [21].6 Compliance can be
achieved through non-governmental means such as social or cultural pressure
from members of the group applying the ethical framework and this compliance
can be as widespread as compliance with a legal rule. Ethical frameworks can
exceed the scope of a legal frameworks (i.e. a behavior is legal but unethical)
or can fall short of it (i.e. a behavior is illegal but ethical). In the first case,
the ethical framework fulfills a guiding function between multiple legal behav-
ioral options, or might be used to reason about situations that are plainly not
covered by law yet. In the second case, the legal framework is often character-
ized to be unfair and/or faulty. In both cases, if the divergence between the law
and the underlying ethics is stark enough a societal pressure is likely to grow,
potentially leading to changes in the legal framework. A different approach of
conceptualizing this is the notion that within a democracy the legitimacy and
content of a legal system originates from its people; because these people are not
ethically blank prior to the establishment of a legal system, the legal system will
inevitably be infused with the ethical system of the people. At the same times,
ethical frameworks are not uniform. Ethical systems, such as cultural or religious
frameworks, can contradict each other. The same is true for ethical systems in
the narrow sense (that is explicitly ethical frameworks), which is evidenced not
only by the fact of the sheer multitude and variance but also by the meta-ethical
disputes about their general viability and validity[6, 26].7 In order to be effec-
would require alignment with some sort of moral standard in order to be considered
valid.
6 The distinction between ethics, religion, social conventions, cultural practices, etc.
is a question of definition. When accepting all of these value systems as “ethics”,
more weight is put on the underlying question of morality. This latter option is
appealing because it coincides with wide usage of the term; for example there is little
value in labeling professional ethic-standards as pseudo-ethical. Consequentially, one
must allow that professional ethic-standards might imply immoral rules, potentially
making them an “immoral ethic framework”. This view is contested, see for just one
account Paul and Elder, but will be utilized here.
7 Difficult questions arise, when trying to assess the existence of morality by itself
and moral facts, the capability to address moral facts by moral statements and if
or to what extent such is accessible through human inquiry at all. Generally, the
meta-validity of ethical systems can be considered mostly with respect to (1) meta-
physical and (2) epistemological positions. When it comes to metaphysical inquiry,
e.g. nihilism/error theory maintain that there are no moral facts on which to base an
ethical theory on, while subjectivism proclaims any moral fact to be inherently sub-
jective. Within an epistemological inquiry, non-cognitivism characterizes all ethical
concepts all expressions of an emotional state rather than an object of knowledge
and as such without objective ethical/moral value. Of course even when finding that
moral facts on which to base an ethical system exist, there is no universal consensus
neither on their content nor on how to find or approximate them.
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tive in effectuating legal frameworks, an ethical framework must either be widely
adopted or intellectually appealing, be it through internal logic, through offering
a solution to a contemporary problem or through prohibitive cognitive costs for
not abiding by it (e.g. deeply rooted beliefs, disavowal of which conflicts directly
with the identity of the agent).8 To assess the flow of imperatives between these
systems, consideration needs to be given to some of the underlying values of the
ethical approach propagated; the proposition being that certain values will give
stronger (factual or moral) justification to the ethical systems that depend on
them. In other words, it is proposed here that the (factual) persuasiveness of
underlying values determines the (factual) adoption of ethical frameworks that
build upon them.
Persuasion aiding the ethical system is rooted in the values of the system
itself, specifically in values that determine if an action is “right” or “wrong”.
Such underlying systems of values and corresponding principles concerned with
(absolute) rights or wrongs are moral frameworks. How exactly these values de-
rive authority (and subsequently grant authority to ethical frameworks based
upon them) is arguably one of the core questions of the scientific discipline
of ethics. Explanation attempts are broadly of two camps: deontological/duty-
based and teleological/end-based assessment of an action. With the former, an
action is right if it is compliant with rules that have a self-evident character (i.e.
Intuitionism) or supernatural endorsement (i.e. Divine Command Theory), legit-
imation through a (hypothetical) form of social cooperation that would lead to
their adoption/finding, i.e. through the fairness of such a process (i.e. Contrac-
tarianism) or that they stem from pure reason (i.e. Formalism). With the latter,
an action is right when it promotes the right end and it is the best action to
promote said end [6]. While only with the latter, the question of right or wrong
is fully subordinate to a question of ends, these overarching moral principles still
impact the framework of the other approaches [7, 23, 12].9
8 This distinction should not be construed to hide that intellectually appealing ethical
frameworks are naturally suited to be or become widespread. However, it is con-
ceivable that certain ethical guidelines might be transplanted into legal frameworks
before they become widespread, or even despite the fact that they deal with a subset
of situations that is just not considered widely enough to enter the general ethical
discourse at all.
9 From a contractarian viewpoint, an action is right or wrong depending on its com-
pliance with a ruleset that is or would have been constructed through a fair process
of people living together in fellowship and treating each other as equals. However,
in that “constitutional” drafting process, the rules agreed upon will likely reflect the
ends (e.g. happiness or pleasure of the individual or the collective). From a divine
command theory-viewpoint, not only are actions wrong that violate the rules of the
authoritative supernatural entity, but the supernatural entity is in itself the origin of
ends; it seems to follows that relevant ends are congruent with (at least compliance
with) the will or aim of the supernatural entity. From the viewpoint of formalism,
pure reason leads to moral principles that satisfy the condition of being a universal
law; all this to ensure that the moral agents are all individually an end in itself.
Similar connections can be made for other ethical approaches.
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The integrity of the research methodology should have now become clear.
Personal Freedom and autonomy is inarguably considered and protected by le-
gal frameworks on national and international level. This protection is reflecting
a corresponding call to do so by ethical frameworks. The ethical frameworks
in question are factually relevant due to the persuasiveness of their underly-
ing moral principles, which mandate that actions undermining autonomy and
personal freedom as morally wrong and protecting and fostering autonomy as
morally right. Depending on the approach, this moral framework is more or less
directly originating due to an end of which autonomy or freedom is a necessary
or helpful requirement, feature or consequence. The validity of this approach, if
not verifiable, can be made plausible by observing the prevalence of rules that
pertain to autonomy and freedom in legal, ethical and moral frameworks.
This is expressively confirmed here: Many rules of international law, having
achieved nearly universal status, address the issue of private autonomy of the
individual. Inter alia, Article 19(1) of the ICCPR and Article 19 of the UDHR
stipulate the freedom to hold opinions without interference as an absolute right.
Article 8, 9 and 10 of the ECHR similarly set out the rule of freedom of thought
and expression as well as broad protection of an individual’s private life[5].10
Protection of autonomy and personal freedom against undue interference by
technology is a relatively new field of (legal) inquiry; it follows that concrete
legal countermeasures are lacking. However, the arising conflicts can be located
within the protective scopes of existing human right frameworks; data-driven
targeting of individuals might collide mainly with (1) the right to privacy and
more specifically data protection, (2) the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
religion and belief , or (3) the right to freedom of opinion, expression and infor-
mation. (Connecting the concepts of privacy and autonomy is the notion that
the right to privacy encompasses (partly) the concept of human autonomy, and
concerns itself specifically with the human being as autonomous subject; in other
words individual autonomy which its existence and field of actions do not touch
upon the sphere of liberty of others is considered privacy by legal scholars[19].
To illustrate, the right to privacy (as a prerequesite for protection of human
autonomy) is enshrined in inter alia Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article 16 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Art. 14 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and the Article 11 of the American Convention
on Human Rights.)
2.3 Interconnectivity as a Catalyst for Paradigm Change
Within the last decades, society has undergone significant changes due to the
increasing prevalence and importance of the Internet. Due to the nature of this
10 The ECHR has found that the terminus “private life” is not accessible to exhaustive
definition, and therefore generally also covers the psychological integrity of a person.
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emerging domain, interactions that have traditionally taken place between hu-
mans now often occur with or are influenced by non-human agents. Algorithms
and similar agents not only directly interact with human users but can also select
and curate the information most humans will reasonably access. Selection and
curation of information for a target audience is not a new phenomenon, however
due to the scalability of the underlying employed technology, automated process-
ing individualized for a single human exacerbates the potential impact of such
endeavors. In addition, such selection is not always obvious to the user, leading
to a lack of critical investigation with respect to the information received.
2.4 Impact on Human Autonomy
Due to the nature and somewhat intelligent adaptiveness of the underlying tech-
nology, respective agents can also cause the human user to change their behavior,
and by induction their underlying thought processes, as part of the optimization
of their employment strategy. In effect, this would constitute a transformative
process, leading to ethical concerns even if all epistemic and normative concerns
have been satisfied previously [15]. This issue is different from change of behav-
ior based on pure exposure, as the behavior change in this case is not strictly
a goal of the deployed agent. By means of indiscriminate goal-setting for such
agents, the accessible variables to optimize can then include the human user. To
illustrate this, the following situation can be imagined as an example: the agent,
an adaptive information algorithm, has the task to select content to be displayed
on the starting page of a social media side. Based on the information about the
user, the agent might only select to present newspaper articles aligning with the
political view of the user, thus creating what has been called a “bubble” [3, 9]
. Alternatively, the adaptive algorithm might learn that one of the “tweakable
variables” is indeed the human user, who can be influenced to fulfil the reward
function of the algorithm more reliably. Such actions might include showing
increasingly more controversial information to provoke the user to engage. An-
other area of conflict arises if the user becomes aware of the impact or reach of
such agents; he or she might change their behavior pre-emptively. Knowing that
certain actions might prompt seemingly unrelated analysis, human users might
proactively abstain from a catalogue of actions, thereby limiting their auton-
omy [20]. The influence or potential manipulations of such agents can therefore
conflict in multiple ways with the principles of autonomy, freedom or free will
which are deemed to be of high importance in contemporary society. Finally, the
question arises if such agents might exercise neutral or beneficial influence, such
as when counteracting harmful influence of other agents or nudging individuals
towards beneficial behavior in a system of limited choices.
2.5 Venues of data-driven human machine interactions
Influence by IoE-agents can be exercised on different interaction-venues. Among
those that are of potentially high impact are in particular (1) Location-Based
Services, (2) Social Credit Systems, (3) Consumer Interactions, (3) Personal
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Health, (4) Journalism / Information Aggregation, (5) Financial Services, and
(6) Individual Pricing.
2.6 Legal Framework
Traditionally, rapid advancement of technology is difficult to address with leg-
islative means in due time. For example, as privacy legislation is enacted to
address gathering and interpreting sensitive information and linking them to a
certain individual, new technologies does not have to rely on a specific iden-
tity of a human user, but allows micro targeting by focusing on the individual’s
relationships and adherence to a defined group [28, 30, 13]. The lag between tech-
nological progress and legislative action creates a gap that requires research in
order to guide later legal actions and to evaluate the impact of actions already
taken. This holds especially true for the essential prerequisite question of ac-
countability when utilizing autonomous agents in the IoE [15, 2, 14].
2.7 Current Academic Activity
Academic inquiries in the nature of human autonomy or freedom, mostly from
the viewpoint of psychology or philosophy are legion. With respect to the re-
search objectives of this project, as far as can be seen, only initial research
has been conducted [29]. Research in the field of privacy, as relevant, is usually
conducted in the legal field (where it follows privacy-related legislation and its
scope and gaps) and the information science field [18]. On the contrary, there
is intense academic activity when it comes to devising ethical frameworks for
artificial intelligence [1, 10, 17]. Attribution of responsibility in multi-agent sys-
tems, especially mixed systems, i.e. systems in which humans and IoE-agents
both are part of the structure, have been identified as an area that warrants
further research. Problem awareness of the compounded issues outlined above
is growing. On the 13th of February 2019, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe adopted a declaration on the manipulative capabilities of al-
gorithmic processes, acknowledging the risk of “fine grained, subconscious and
personalized levels of algorithmic persuasion [4]. Similarly, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has reflected on the
negative impact of Artificial Intelligence on individual’s rights to expression and
opinion in its Report dated 29th of August 2018 [27]. More broadly, the Eu-
ropean Commission has established a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial
Intelligence to address, among others, these emerging issues. Similar analysis
has been conducted in Non-European countries as well [22]. Similarly, academic
research has been starting to focus on this situation. Efforts have started to be
steered towards better analysis of certain aspects the problem outlined above,
in particular towards the conflict between commercial use of such agents and
consumer protection legislation [8].
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3 Research Questions
3.1 Primary Research Questions
Research will be guided along the lines of two primary research questions:
– What is the level of freedom an individual can maintain in situations where
multiagent systems decide on behalf of the individual?
– What kind of autonomy can an individual develop if all the options are
previously detected and addressed?
3.2 Secondary Research Questions
In addition, and only to the extent that this serves to build a necessary funda-
ment of understanding and supports the above, a set of supplementary research
question will be examined:
– How does influence of agents on the autonomy of humans manifests itself in
the IoE?
– How is the type of effectiveness of influence predicated by the underlying
technology or method of an agent?
– How is such influence in contrast or to the benefit of the principle of human
autonomy?
– How do different interaction-venues facilitate or inhibit influence and what
is their effect on the resulting consequences of effective influence?
– How can humans become part of the optimization process of adaptive agents
and what is the impact of such adjustment?
– How are existing legal and ethical frameworks equipped to deal with such
influence?
4 Research Objective - Contribution to Current
Knowledge in the Domain
The main contributions of the research project to the academic body of knowl-
edge is expected to be in the following areas:
– Attribution and Responsibility of Agents of the IoE
– Exercise of Autonomy in Systems constrained by Agents of the IoE
– Ethical Frameworks for Agents of the IoE
5 Methodology
The nature of the research proposed is interdisciplinary, consequently the meth-
ods undertaken will be heterogeneous. An overview is given in the following
paragraphs.
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5.1 Law and Policy
With respect to questions of law and policy, the research methodology will be
dictated by a (qualitative) black-letter approach to analyze the statutes and ju-
risprudence of relevant jurisdictions. Due to language abilities, focus will be laid
on jurisdictions where legal sources are available in English or German. Where
appropriate, comparative analysis of the legal situations within the jurisdictions
in question will be conducted. Resources used will be both primary (i.e. laws,
court cases) and secondary, where available. Where the legislative umbrella fails
to cover a situation of interest, recommendations lege ferenda will be given where
appropriate. Similarly to the outlined above, instruments of soft law or similar
(guidelines, reports, etc.) will be referenced and analyzed.
5.2 Philosophy / Ethics
Moral and Ethical frameworks with respect to the area of inquiry will be ana-
lyzed, interpreted and compared. Creation of an ethical framework will be at-
tempted with respect to the means of influence of agents of the IoE. The research
method will be qualitative and interpretivist.
5.3 Computer Science / Information Science
Extrapolation from current scholarship with respect to agents deployed in the
IoE and their potential to impact private autonomy and algorithmic influence
shall be attempted. Starting from a consolidation of fundamental principles of
function, uses and limitations of such agent, their potential impact will be as-
sessed based on their technological capabilities; areas of risk with respect to
autonomy / freedom originating from the underlying technical approach of such
agents will be determined and highlighted. Agents will be assessed abstractly;
no model building will be attempted.
5.4 Social and Cognitive Science
Current findings in the field of the effects of algorithmic manipulations will be
consolidated, compared and interpreted. Similarly, findings in the field of private
autonomy, free will and personal freedom will be consolidated and reviewed for
their applicability to the topic of interest as laid out above. Out of this research,
a working model of human autonomy will be synthesized to be used in the
dissertation, as to avoid ambiguities when elaborating on the subject. Where
research in the other areas leads to the conclusion that specific promising theories
have not been made plausible yet, original research will be conducted as far as
the provided resources allow for it.
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